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POLITICAL
INFLUENCES ON THE
DEVELOPMENT OF TELEVISION
This chapter will identify
how television has been influenced by the political
situation in Brazil, and will concentrate its attention
on the Médici (1969-1974) and Geisel (1974-1979) administrations.
The broadcast media in Brazil have
been influenced and used by such political leaders as
President Getúlio Vargas (1930-1945; 1951-1954), and
by the presidents following the revolutionary movement
of 1964, such as President Emílio Médici. (1)
Getúlio Vargas, who, by means of a coup d'état
in 1937, established a dictatorial regime, used radio
to facilitate his political career.(2) At that
time the social and political situation was controlled
with strong censorship. Since 1964, however, both radio
and television have been used by the military regime
as a tool for its political, economic, and social purposes,
in accordance with the National Security Council's objectives
(discussed in chapter 2).
Brazilian Political
Characteristics
This section summarizes the principal
characteristics of the political system in Brazil after
the Second World War. (3) Thus, in order to facilitate
a better understanding of the political situation, I
divided it into two periods, the 1946-1964 period, and
the 1964-1979 period. According to the military regime's
spokesmen, everything that has been done in this second
period has, among other things', been aimed at the restoration
of democracy and the salvation of Brazil from "communism,
corruption and chaos." (4)
According to the classification
developed by José Odelso Schneider, the first period
was a liberal one characterized by: (1) liberal democracy
with a presidential regime; (2) multiple political parties;
(3) political instability and administrative corruption;
(4) industrial expansion; (5) occupation of the national
territory starting with the construction of Brasilia;
and elaboration of the first plans of economic regional
development (which were not realized because of the
lack of administrative continuity).
The second period, from 1964 to
1979, was a period characterized by: (1) technocratic-military
government; (2) concentration of power in the executive
branch; (3) emphasis on an ambitious national plan of
economic development; (4) reduction of the number of
political parties to only two; (5) the National Security
Council as the moderator. 5 The second period of Brazilian politics can be further
divided into three phases: (1) the 1964-1967 period,
in which emphasis was given to the economic-capitalist
and institutional reorganization; (2) the 1968-1973
period, which was characterized by fast growth and by
efforts to promote national integration; and (3) the
1974-1977 period which was considered a transition phase
in the economic readaptation related to the world-wide
energy crisis, as well as in relation to the new stage
of industrial development.(6) According to Brazil:
14 anos de revolução, this last stage could be prolonged.
(7)
The Proliferation
of TV Stations
Brazilian TV has undergone
several transformations since its beginning, in which
technological, economic, social, and political changes
have contributed directly or indirectly to its growth.
According to José Marques de Melo,
the initial growth of Brazilian television may be attributed
to political favoritism, which called for the concession
of television channels without any preconceived plan.(8)
In this sense, the proliferation of Brazilian TV stations
has paralleled television growth in numerous other countries.
The proliferation of television
stations began before the military regime’s takeover,
during the administration of President Juscelino Kubitschek.
After the establishment of the Ministry of Communications
in 1967, television channel licensing began to take
into account not only national necessities but also
the National Security Council's objectives of national
development and integration. Table 5 shows the concessions
of television channels in Brazil between 1955 and 1979.
During Kubitschek’s term in office,
Brazil underwent a period of optimistic development.
Television represented progress so businessmen made
investments without any serious consideration of the
social, economic, or political implications of the new
medium.
During the first four years of the
sixties, the Brazilian political and economic situation
was unstable. Inflation was uncontrolled, strikes were
commonplace, and an internal tension was increasing.
It was during that time that the government elaborated
the first code of telecommunications (see Chapter 3).
TABLE 5
|
Number
of TV Stations Licenses,by Period and
President
|
| Period
and President(s) |
Number
of Licenses |
1955-1960
Café Filho:1954-1956
J. Kubitschek:1956-1961
|
8
|
1960-1964
J. Kubitschek:1956-1961
Jânio Quadros:1961
João Goulart :1961-1964
|
14
|
1964-1969
H.A. Castelo Branco:1964-1967
A.da Costa e Silva:1967-1969
|
23
|
1969-l974
Emilio G. Medici: 1969-1974
|
20
|
1974-1979
Ernesto Geisel: 1974-1979
|
47
|
| Total |
112
|
| Source:
SSR/Secretary of Broadcast Services of the
Ministry of Communications. |
In 1964, when the military revolution
replaced President João Goulart, there was a radical
change in the political situation. This change affected
television stations directly because both the political
system and the socioeconomic situation of the country
were totally modified. As a result, the revenue from
advertising was decreased, and stations needed to find
other ways of solving financial problems. The military
regime established a new political system in which mass
media communications were accepted as agent of modernization
and as a tool for the maintenance of national integration,
national security, and social peace.
During the first six years of the
new political system, Brazilian telecommunications services
underwent a technical transformation. The government
created new conditions for the expansion of broadcast
services and established the regulatory agencies which
were concerned with the technical and economic situation
of the broadcast enterprises The new technocratic-military
system got involved with television, principally in
reference to issues such as ownership, control, and
financial support. However, the government did not express
concern about the influence and content of television
programs until 1970.
Television
Content and Official Influence
As discussed in Chapter 3, broadcast
enterprises are under government control, which encompasses,
besides concession of licenses and allocation of frequencies,
a series of political considerations such as censorship
and direct governmental recommendations on program content.
Before President Médici took office, the government
had worried only about technological aspects of television,
but from Médici's government on, the state began to
concern itself directly with the content of the mass
media. (9) In January 1970, President Médici
signed a decree, which banned all publications, and
broadcast features found "offensive to morals or good
customs," (10) and in September 1970, he sent a message
to the participants in the VI Brazilian Broadcast Congress,
which took place in Poços de Caldas, Minas Gerais. In
his message, President Médici said that he believed
in the evolution of Brazilian television because he
felt "television to be indispensable" to the acceleration
of services for social well being. He further stated
that businessmen need to look for a noble objective
for Brazilian commercial television because the "government
cannot wait inactively and silently, while competition
increases the size of audience, resulting in a loss
for the populace which is deprived of educational TV
programs" (11).
His words reverberated among businessmen
involved in Brazilian television. From that date, the
government began to concern itself officially with the
quality level of programs in order to counteract the
effects of programs which offered more and more suspense,
action. Strong emotions, and violence, all of which
contributed to growth in audience size and in profits
for the television stations. According to research undertaken
from March 18 to March 24, 1969, by the Jornal do
Brasil, violence was among the appeals most utilized
by television in Rio de Janeiro. Table 6 lists some
of the themes of television programs in Rio de Janeiro.
TABLE 6
| Program
Themes March 18-24,1969 |
%
of Total Number of Programs |
| Traditional
values of childhood and family |
47.73
|
| Violence |
43.77
|
| Ostentation
and upward social mobility |
30.12
|
| Fantasy |
26.20
|
| Eroticism |
03.90
|
| Youth
movement |
08.60
|
| Humor |
33.31
|
| Politics |
14.58
|
| Culture
and Technology |
17.17
|
| Grotesque
topics |
05.25
|
| Source:
Muniz Sodré, 1971, p. 68 |
At the end of 1971, the "lower quality
of taste" of the programs broadcast by the commercial
stations led to the naming of an interministerial commission
to study television content (see the list of typical
weekly programs in 1971 in Table 7). The members of
that commission were representatives of different ministries:
the Ministry of Communications, the Ministry of Education,
the Ministry of Justice, and the Ministry of Labor.
The conclusions of the commission were never divulged.
According to Hygino Corsetti, who served as minister
of communications during Médici's administration, the
conclusions were presented to and discussed with the
concessionaires. The Ministry of Communications recognized
that television was a factor in development and an instrument
of social and economic integration. Corsetti explained
the interference of his Ministry in the content of television
by saying that Brazilian television was not following
the government' 5 efforts in the electronic sector to
build a great Brazil, economically strong and "'culturally
modern":
First of all, I want to say that
my interference has President Médici's knowledge and
recommendations. I confess that the quality of what
is being presented by Brazilian TV is already as much
of a concern to me as the extension of networks and
the technical improvement on the quality of the images.
(12)
The Médici administration was particularly
important to the development of Brazilian television
because it established the National Program for Educational
Television (Prontel), it expanded the infrastructure
of telecommunication services, it introduced color television,
and it facilitated the emergence of new sources of television
advertising revenues by means of the "Economic Miracle".
(Economic influences on the development of television
are further discussed in the next chapter). And it was
in the name of the National Security Council and in
order to maintain social peace and national development
that during Médici’s term in office the mass media (principally
radio and television) were subjected more and more to
censorship.
TABLE 7
|
Television
Content, 1971
|
| Broadcast
Content |
Total
Hours/Week |
| Film |
1.080,5 |
| Advertising |
557.9 |
| Soap
Opera |
416.7 |
| Game
Shows |
307.6 |
| Sports |
262.5 |
| News |
241.2 |
| Education |
218.2 |
| Humor |
152.0 |
| Popular
Music |
114.6 |
| Arts,literature,and
science |
59.2 |
| Religion |
19.2 |
| Theater
and Poetry |
15.3 |
| Source:
Anuário Estatístico do Brasil, 1972:869 |
From Médici's administration through
Ernesto Geisel's, many ministers, teachers, and critics
made speeches about the educational and cultural implications
of television, about its program content, and about
its negative effects. As a result, Brazilian television
improved its techniques and "cultural standards" and
nationalized its programming (see Chapter 1). In this
manner, the ministers began to address policy issues
more intensively. One preoccupation of the government
was expressed in the message by Euclides Quandt de Oliveira
(minister of communications during Geisel's administration)
to the Sixth Brazilian Tele-Education Meeting, which
took place in Belo Horizonte in October 1974. According
to Quandt de Oliveira,
Brazilian commercial TV is based
on a philosophy of private enterprise but, because of
its strength of penetration and persuasion, it cannot
be treated as other mass media, i.e., the press. Because
of its specific nature it must be entrusted with a great
deal of responsibility in respect to culture, education,
and national efforts for development. This can only
become true if the right message reaches the right audience.
Commercial experience and research data might provide
useful cues for such an enterprise. (13)
The Geisel administration, through
its minister of communications, Quandt de Oliveira,
addressed many recommendations to broadcast enterprises.
These recommendations exerted a strong influence on
television networks, which were continually reminded
of their responsibilities to national development and
national culture. On November 19,1974,during a lecture
at the Anhembi Faculty of Social Communication, Quandt
de Oliveira talked about the canned material broadcast
by Brazilian television:
57% of a TV program is imported
and Brazilian technicians produce 43%. From this 43%,
34% is foreign material, edited by Brazilian stations.
That means, for 109 hours of a one week program, only
31 are genuinely Brazilian: the other 78 are imported.
... Commercial TV imposes upon children and youth a
kind of culture that has nothing to do with Brazilian
culture... Instead of acting as a factor of creation
and diffusion of Brazilian culture, TV is playing the
role of a privileged medium of cultural import, and
is denaturing Brazilian creativity. (14)
Quandt de Oliveira made another
speech October 1974, to the Fourth Southern States of
Brazil Congress on Broadcasting:
The ministry ... expects that radio
and television stations will fulfill their contractual
and legal obligations, their code of ethics, so as to
reach increased cooperation for the achievement of goals
compatible with the efforts of a country to take off
from underdevelopment to its deserved position in the
world picture (15).
In 1977, Minister Quandt de Oliveira
addressed another speech to broadcast managers, during
the Fourth Centerwestern Congress of Broadcast (Belo
Horizonte, May 18). In that speech the minister of communications
criticized the excessive violence on Brazilian television
and argued that violence is a problem that must be resolved
by the concessionaires themselves. As support for his
criticism, Quandt de Oliveira said that a group from
his ministry had monitored violence on afternoon programs
during a month, or 200 hours, on two television stations
in Brasilia. The minister announced that the National
Communications Council had been reorganized and that
it would "dedicate a large part of its attention to
the content transmitted by Brazilian radio and television,
in order to establish norms and orientations related
to the topic of violence. It does not intend to intervene
in the freedom of choice of the programs by the men
of television, but all these problems will be discussed
by the Council itself." (16)
The growth of Brazilian television
occurred during a time (1968-1979) when it had to operate
under restrictions established by Institutional Act
no.5 of December 13, 1968, when the president could
make secret laws, and when Brazilian institutions were
controlled by strong censorship. Between December 1968
and June 1978 (Press censorship in Brazil was officially
ended on June 8, 1978), Brazilian mass media were controlled
by strong censorship, which was exerted in accordance
with the censor’s criteria. During that time, "it was
difficult to broadcast about almost anything of importance."(17)
This being the case, one can infer that Quandt de Oliveira
recommendations exerted a strong influence on television
content. As a result of the recommendations, admonitions,
and criticism, television nationalized its programs,
which today are typically Brazilian in treatment, theme,
and style.
However, although the Médici and
Geisel administrations made a solid contribution to
the improvement of the "cultural standard" and technical
quality of television programs, they were responsible
for strong censorship, which mutilated and limited Brazilian
television. According to Gerald Thomas, "in
1974, for instance, no less than 103 items were banned
from TV and radio. The bans ranged from political issues
to a beauty contest. In 1978, only seven items were
banned, and this might appear a reassuring figure compared
to 1974. But statistics are misleading, and recent prohibitions
cover a much wider ground." (18) Further,
In São Paulo 36 newsmen from Radio
Tupi were dismissed for refusing to alter a program
to be shown jointly on TV and radio. Only 15 minutes
before it was due to go on the air, the censor's phone
call "advised" them to cut a whole speech from the program
by the Archbishop of São Paulo, Cardinal Arns, one of
the most outspoken personalities in Brazil's recent
history. The producers demanded a written order. The
impracticability of the demand was clear: the phone
call came from Brasília and the station is in São Paulo,
so the program was shown as scheduled. After two weeks
of pressure from the government and Tupi's managers,
the newsmen were dismissed. (19)
PREFACE / INTRODUCTION / 1. A BRIEF HISTORY OF BRAZILIAN TELEVISION
/ 2. THE IMPACT OF THE MILITARY REGIME ON TELEVISION
/ 3. THE INFLUENCE OF COMMUNICATION LAWS AND REGULATORY
AGENCIES ON THE GROWTH OF TELEVISION / 4.
POLITICAL INFLUENCES ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF TELEVISION
/ 5. SOCIOECONOMIC INFLUENCES ON THE DEVELOPMENT
OF TELEVISION / 6.SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS / 7. NOTES / 8. BIBLIOGRAPHY / 9.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
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